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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 88-0313 
-v- : 
JON C. VASILACOPULOS, : PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 
NO. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
RESPONSE TO QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly found that the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion 
to withdraw his plea of guilty to three felony counts of theft 
by deception. 
A. The record as a whole clearly demonstrates that 
the trial court failed in its statutory compliance with Rule 
11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code Ann. 
Section 77-35-ll[e]) when it accepted defendant's plea of guilty 
to three counts of felony theft by deception. 
3. The defendant's attorney's request for concurrent 
sentences at the sentencing hearing is "after the fact." The 
violation of the Rule 11(e) mandate of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure occurred at the defendant's change of plea hearing 
held on February 17, 1984. Furthermore, Section 77-13-6 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Utah Code Ann., 
1988, clearly sets no time limit for the withdrawal of a plea 
of guilty by the defendant. 
C. The defendant in the instant case more than clearly 
satisfied his burden of showing good cause why he should be 
permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty to three counts of 
felony theft by deception. 
D. The Utah Court of Appeals properly applied by 
Utah statutory law this Court's Rule 11(e) mandate and its 
precedents of law as contained respectively therein. 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION 
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion,of which the defendant 
now replies in opposition, is that of State v. Vasilacopulos, 
756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant submits that the petitioner in this 
matter is the State of Utah. They are currently seeking review 
of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision entered on June 3, 1988. 
Further, the State's Petition for Rehearing was denied on July 
19, 1988. This Court has jurisdiction to hear defendant's 
response in opposition pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. with 
respect to Section 78-2-2(5) as contained therein. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The defendant in the instant case submits that the 
controlling statutory provisions were reproduced in full in 
the appendix of the petition of the State of Utah, in which 
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they are seeking review by Certiorari in this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case of which the petitioner, 
State of Utah, is seeking review by this Court. The defendant 
was charged with one second degree felony of theft by deception 
on November 13, 1981 (R. 67). The information was subsequently 
amended, charging the defendant in the second amended information 
with twenty counts of felony theft by deception in violation 
of the Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405, composed of fifteen second 
degree felony counts and five third degree felony counts (R. 
81-86). 
The petitioner, State of Utah, fails to properly 
and adequately state the true and correct facts of this case. 
After the defendant was charged with the "initial" one second 
degree felony count of theft by deception on November 13, 1981, 
additional criminal charges were to follow. Subsequently, 
three days later on November 16, 1981, the defendant was charged 
with four additional counts of felony theft by deception. 
Then, some eleven months later, an additional fifteen counts 
of felony theft by deception were charged. Usually, this is 
called "stacking the deck" against the defendant when the state 
is fearful that they may not have a strong enough case against 
the defendant, ultimately forcing the defendant into a plea 
bargain on the dismissal of other counts, as were the facts 
of this case that is presently before this Court for review. 
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Furthermore, the defendant submits that the past actions of 
the State of Utah in the instant case were ones of malicious 
prosecution. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS 
The defendant's plea of guilty was accepted by the 
trial court on February 17, 1984, to three counts of felony 
theft by deception (R. 93). The defendant again appeared before 
the trial court on August 12, 1985, for sentencing and was 
ordered to serve three consecutive terms of incarceration in 
the Utah State Prison for a maximum of twenty five years and 
fined $20,000.00 (R. 157). 
The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration 
of sentence in November, 1985, a petiton for habeas corpus 
relief in June, 1986, a motion for resentencing in February, 
1987, and a motion to withdraw his plea in September, 1987. 
The trial court denied the defendant's motions and dismissed 
his petition. The defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from 
the trial court's denial of his motion for resentencing, a 
petition for Writ of Mandamus, and a Notice of Appeal from 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea 
of guilty. The above three actions were consolidated for appeal 
by order of the Utah Court of Appeals on November 19, 1987, 
as case number 87-0291-CA. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, unanimously by a vote 
of three to zero, reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty on June 3, 1988. The 
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State's Petition for Rehearing was denied on July 19, 1988, 
and the Utah Court of Appeals issued an order Staying the 
Remittitur on July 21, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant, Jon C. Vasilacopulos, was charged 
with one second degree felony count of theft be deception on 
November 13, 1981 (R. 67). The information was subsequently 
amended several times, charging the defendant in an amended 
information with twenty felony counts of theft by deception 
(R. 81-86). 
A preliminary hearing was held in the Fifth Circuit 
Court on several occasions with respect to the instant case 
which lasted approximately some seven months in itself, from 
November 22, 1982, until May 17, 1983. Furthermore, defendant 
now submits that as of the date of the filing of the one original 
count charging him with a felony of theft by deception on November 
13, 1981, until the time of the last preliminary hearing which 
was held on May 17, 1983, a time period of some eighteen months 
had expired in the instant case. 
The defendant was bound over for trial on eighteen 
of the twenty felony counts of theft by deception (R. 5-6). 
Further, defendant was arraigned on July 18, 1983, and received 
a copy of the "complaint" through his counsel, who then waived 
the reading of the information therein, and entered a plea 
of not guilty to the eighteen counts of felony theft by deception 
(R. 92). 
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The defendant appeared before the trial court on 
February 17, 1984, and entered a plea of guilty to three counts 
of felony theft by deception (R. 93). Further, defendant executed 
an "affidavit of defendant" (R. 109-110), and also, a memorandum 
agreement at the conclusion of the hearing (R. 103-108). 
Then, on August 12, 1985, the defendant was sentenced 
(R. 157-159). Defendants sentences on the three felony counts 
to which he pled [SIC] guilty were ordered by the trial court 
to run consecutively (R. 157-159, and R. 342, p. 8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant submits that a Writ of Certiorari should 
not be granted by this Court pursuant to Rule 43(2) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, inasmuch as the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals was, in fact, proper and consistent with 
prior holdings in cases of this Honorable Court. Furthermore, 
the Utah Court of Appeals, under Rule 4B(A)(B)(C), Certification 
by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, could have, at 
their discretion, and on the affirmative vote of four judges 
of the Court, certified the instant case for immediate transfer 
to the Supreme Court for determination. 
Also, under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
the petitioner, State of Utah, had the option available to 
them to file a "suggestion for certification" to the Utah Supreme 
Court to hear defendant's appeal, but failed to do so. Now, 
the petitioner, State of Utah, is using "Certiorari" to circumvent 
the appellate process and the rights of the defendant as guaranteed 
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to him by "due process of law" under Article I, Sections 1, 
8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and 
also under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
Accordingly/ Rule 4(c)(1) of the Utah Court of Appeals 
states in pertinent: 
Rule 4(c): The Court of Appeals shall consider 
certification only in the following cases: 
(1) Cases which are of such nature that is so 
apparent that the case should be decided by the Supreme 
Court and that the Supreme Court would probably grant 
a petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the case if 
decided by the Court of Appeals, irrespective of how 
the Court of Appeals might rule. 
Further, Hornbook Law on the statutory interpretation 
of the word "shall" does not allow for discretion to deviate. 
In any event, if the Utah Court of Appeals would 
have thought that their opinion in the instant case would be 
reversed by the Utah Supreme Court by way of "Certiorari," 
the defendant is only led to believe that the Utah Court of 
Appeals would have exercised its appellate discretion under 
Rule 4B(A)(B) and (C) of the rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and then and there certified the defendant's case to the Utah 
Supreme Court for final disposition. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY 
APPLIED THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS IN 
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY 
The record in the instant case clearly establishes 
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that the trial court did not comply with all the statutory 
requirements and applicable case law as required for both the 
taking of guilty pleas under Rule 11(e), and attempts to withdraw 
such pleas as set forth in the Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. The 
request to withdraw a plea of guilty is not automatically or 
mandatorily granted, but only upon a showing of good cause 
and with leave of the court. SEE: State v. Mildenall, 70 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17 (November 19, 1987). 
Further, petitioner, State of Utah, cites the case 
of State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977), which states 
in the pertinent part: 
The court is not bound to any rigidity of rule 
or procedure, but may do it in any manner consistent 
with reason and fairness which he thinks will best 
accomplish that purpose. 
This case cited by the petitioner does not apply 
to the instant case of the defendant. The trial court was 
bound by the requirements of Rule 11(e) in the instant case. 
It was the trial court's responsibility to notify the defendant 
before he pled guilty that, on the entrance of a plea of guilty 
to three felony counts of theft by deception, that said felony 
counts would be ordered to run consecutively. The particular 
case at bar raises a substantial "liberty interest" and a violation 
of the defendant's "rights to due process" of law, which is 
guaranteed to him under Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, and further, under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
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For Example: 
If the trial court would have informed the defendant 
of the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences 
before pleading guilty, the defendant submits that he would 
not have plead guilty and the end result would have substantially 
been different. 
Again, in this particular case, the difference between 
concurrent and consecutive sentences substantially violated 
the defendant's "rights to due process" of law, because of 
the trial court's failure by not forewarning the defendant 
of such a possibility. The defendant has been subject to ten 
additional years of imprisonment, of which is surely a "liberty 
interest" on the part of the defendant. 
Another case cited by the petitioner is that of State 
v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977). Again, the instant case 
has rro similarities to that of Yeck, Supra, for the trial court 
did, in fact, abuse its discretion. SEE: State v. Vasilacopulos, 
756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals1 decision reversing the defendant's 
convictions was based on their determination that the trial 
court failed to find that the defendant understood the possibility 
of consecutive sentences when pleading to multiple charges. 
The exchange between the trial court and defendant 
was accompanied by the defendant's execution of an affidavit 
to which the Court referred (R. 340, p. 6). That affidavit 
(R. 109-110) demonstrates that the defendant was unaware of 
his rights and that he did not understand the nature of the 
charges against him and the ramifications of his plea of guilty. 
The affidavit of defendant fails to comply with Rule 
11(e)(4) with respect to the elements of the crime charged, 
and the facts relating to a charge of theft by deception. 
The record in this case is silent, and the affidavit is devoid 
of any such statement. The affidavit (R. 109-110) only states 
the following: 
Elements: Facts: 
Incorporated in the Incorporated in the 
second information second information 
by reference. by reference. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Gibbons, 
Supra, quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), that 
"clearly the plea could not have been voluntary in the sense 
that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed 
the offense unless the defendant received real notice of the 
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally 
recognized requirements of due process." I.D. at 645 (quoting 
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). Furthermore, to 
make a knowing guilty plea, the defendant must understand the 
elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of law 
to the facts. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), 
the Supreme Court held, in construing Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the factual elements of the 
charges against the defendant must be explainted in the taking 
of a guilty plea so that the defendant understands and admits 
those elements: 
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[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all 
the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot 
be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses 
an understanding of the law to the facts . . . . 
. . . . the judge must determine 'that the conduct 
which the defendant admits constitutes the offense 
charged in the indictment or information or an offense 
included therein to which the defendant has plead 
guilty' • " • -
. . . . There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating 
in the record at the time the plea is entered the 
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge 
against him. 
I.D at 466/ 467/ 470 (citations omitted/ footnotes omitted/ 
emphasis in the original). The trial court failed to follow 
this Rule 11(e) requirement in the instant case of the defendant. 
The affidavit also sets forths the prison term of 
1 to 15 years for a second degree felony and 0 to 5 years for 
a third degree felony/ but fails to show the additional 0 to 
5 years for a third degree felony. Therefore/ the minimum 
and maximum period of incarceration was not disclosed to the 
defendant/ nor was the possibility of the imposition of consec-
utive sentences which were imposed by the trial court/ ultimately 
making the minimum sentence 1 year and the maximum sentence 
of incarceration/ 25 years. In order for the affidavit to 
meet the standards set forth in Utah Rules of Criminal Prodecure, 
§ 77-35-11/ and Boykin/ Supra/ the affidavit would need to 
have reflected the following: 
1 - 1 5 years for a crime of theft by deception/ for 
a second degree felony/ and 0 - 5 years for a third 
degree felony, and 0 - 5 years for a third degree 
felony/ said sentences may also be ordered to run 
consecutively, meaning a maximum of a 25 year prison 
term being imposed. 
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The affidavit also indicates a $10,000,00 fine, which 
is the maximum fine imposed on a felony of the second degree. 
The $5,000.00 maximum fine that could be imposed on a third 
degree felony was not listed. Therefore, the additional $10,000.00 
fine ordered by the trial court was in error. The trial court 
had the responsibility to notify the defendant on the record 
as to the defendant's liabilities to fines on the entrance 
of a guilty plea to three counts of theft by deception, and 
the fines being part of the defendant's consequences of his 
plea, and the ramification it would have on the defendant at 
the time of his sentencing. 
The petitioner, State of Utah, now cites the holdings 
in Guglielmetti, Supra; Lindenman v. Morris, 641 P.2d 133 (Utah 
1982), and Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 641 (Utah 1982). In 
the case of Lindenman, this Court held: 
The validity of the plea is further bolstered 
by the appellant's acknowledgement that it was decided 
upon with the full advise of counsel. I.D. at 135. 
The above cases cited by the petitioner do not apply to the 
case of defendant. In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S 637, Justice 
White wrote: 
[l]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty 
plea to be entered against a defendant solely on the 
consent of the defendant's agent, his — lawyer. 
Our cases make absolutely clear that the choice to 
plead guilty must be the defendant's: it is he who 
must be informed of the consequences of his plea and 
what it is he waives when he pleads, Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); and it is on his admission 
that he is in fact guilty that his conviction will 
rest. I.D. at 650. 
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This Court reaffirmed the findings of Henderson, 
Supra, recently in the case of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987). It held, quoting Henderson, the following for 
the record: 
Because of the importance of compliance with 
Rule 11(e) and Boykin, the law places the burden of 
establishing compliance with those requirements on 
the trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that 
defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully 
understand the contents of the affidavit. 
Therefore, as previously stated by this Court in 
Henderson and Gibbons, Supras, the petitioner's claim on the 
advise of counsel to the defendant when he entered his plea 
of guilty will not now stand for any kind of analysis. Also 
see: State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988). 
The petitioner, State of Utah, cites with respect 
to the question of consecutive sentences, paragraph 7 of the 
"affidavit of defendant," which reads in the pertinent part: 
I also know that if I am on probation, parole, 
or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which 
I have been convicted or to which I have plead [sic] 
guilty, my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
A mere child can see that this particular paragraph does not 
apply or refer to the possibility of consecutive sentences 
being imposed. Contrary, in the plain reading of paragraph 
7 of the "affidavit of defendant," it states that consecutive 
sentences may result only if a person were on probation, parole, 
or awaiting sentencing upon another offense to which he or 
she committed prior to the plea agreement and the signing of 
the instant affidavit. Also see: Memorandum decision of the 
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Honorable Timothy R. Hanson (R. 199-204 [V. v D.], and State 
v, Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 [Utah App. 1988]). 
Furthermore/ the Rule 11(e) mandate is clear. The 
requirement to inform a defendant of the possibility of consecutive 
sentences when pleading to multiple offenses is not discretionary. 
The Rule 11(e) mandate for the acceptance of a plea of guilty 
uses the word and term "shall" not "may". Hornbook Law on 
statutory interpretation of the word "shall" does not allow 
for discretion to deviate. 
The petitioner, State of Utah/ further recites from 
the transcript of the plea proceedings at page 6 (R. 340)/ 
that the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: And do you understand the contents of that 
document? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
The defendant/ in responding to this question by 
the trial court, did understand the "affidavit of defendant" 
on the issue of consecutive sentences. Defendant understood 
that by the plain reading of paragraph 7 of the Boykin affidavit/ 
he, in fact, could not be given consecutive sentences because 
^
e
 did not meet the criteria as set forth in paragraph 7 of 
the affidavit. 
Further, it was the obligation of the trial court 
to articulate on the record to the defendant, before he entered 
his plea of guilty to three counts of felony theft by deception, 
that said counts may be imposed consecutively. See: Utah Code 
Ann., 1982, Rule 11(e), Section 77-35-11, and Rules of Practice, 
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Rule 3.6, Pleas of Guilty (A)(B)(C)(D). 
The petitioner. State of Utah/ recites at length 
from three cases in similarity/ Warner, Brooks/ and Miller. 
First/ the Miller case does not apply to the case of the defendant. 
The Warner case only specifically addressed the self-incrimination 
issue. In the instant case/ the record is clear from the transcript 
of hearing of defendant's change of plea held on February 17, 
1984/ and the "affidavit of defendant" involving his plea. 
The record as a whole in this case does not establish that 
the defendant entered his plea of guilty with full knowledge 
of its consequences/ including the possibility of a $20,000.00 
fine, full restitution, and namely, consecutive sentences. 
Further, the same would hold true in Brooks, Supra. 
In Miller, this Court held: 
In the instant case/ defendant has not supplied 
us with a transcript of the arraignment hearing where 
he entered his guilty plea or with any other evidence 
that the court failed to fully explain the consequences 
of the plea. (Citing: State v. Robbins/ Utah 709 
P.2d 771 [1985]; State v. Jones/ Utah 657 P.2d 1263 
[1982]. 
Again/ the Miller case is different than the case at hand. 
The defendant has supplied a transcript of the change of plea 
hearing dated on February 17, 1984, and has also shown clear 
and concise evidence that the trial court failed to fully explain 
the consequences of his plea of guilty. See: State v. Vasilacopulos, 
756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988). 
The defendant again submits that the Utah Code Ann., 
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Section 77-13-6, sets no statutory time limit for the withdrawal 
of a plea of guilty, and therefore, the case cited by the petitioner 
in State v. Jaramillo, 481 P.2d 394 (Utah 1971) does not apply 
to the instant case at hand. This fact is further bolstered 
by this Courtfs findings in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987). This Court held: 
Section 77-13-6 sets no time limit for the with-
drawal of a plea. Defendant has filed to first file 
a motion to withdraw his plea, thereby disallowing 
the trial court the opportunity to address an alleged 
error. 
The petitioner, State of Utah, now in a last-ditch 
effort, cites the case of State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986). The case of Kay has no similarities to that of the 
instant case. In the case of Kay, the defendant entered a 
conditional plea of guilty, to avoid Utah's death penalty. 
This Court held the following: 
[8-10] The record before us leaves jio question 
that Kay's pleas were voluntary. Kay vigorously argues 
that the pleas were freely and knowingly given in 
an effort to avoid the death penalty. 
In addition: 
[34-15] Accordingly, a Rule 11 error will not 
invalidate the plea taken unless the error results 
in a substantial violation of a party's rights. In 
the present case, we find no error that affects the 
substantial rights of a party . . . 
As set forth above, the defendant submits that his 
case is different that Kay. The record in Kay supports the 
fact that his plea of guilty was voluntary. In the instant 
case, the defendant is claiming something totally different. 
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Defendant claims that his plea of guilty to three felony counts 
of theft by deception were/ in fact/ involuntary and inappropriately 
taken by the trial court/ due to the trial court's failure 
to comply with the statutory requirements of Rule 11(e) of 
the Utah Code Ann., 1982, § 77-35-11/ in the acceptance of 
defendant's plea of guilty with respect to subsection (4) and 
(5) of the rule in their entirety. Incidentally/ this Court 
should also be made aware of the fact that the case cited by 
the petitioner, State of Utah/ (that of Kay) was not part of 
the court record below. Nevertheless/ defendant submits that 
this particular case does not apply to the instant case before 
this Court. 
Further/ the petitioner contends that the instant 
case should be declared as a "harmless error" with respect 
to Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure/ U.C.A. 
1953, § 77-35-30(a) - (Repl. Vol. 8c, 1982). Again, a mere 
child can see that Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
does not apply in the instant case presently pending before 
this Court for review. A brief review of the record clearly 
shows that the defendant has suffered a substantial violation 
of his rights to "due process of law" on the issue of consecutive 
sentences. Furthermore, not to mention the defendant's "loss 
of liberty" interests with respect to concurrent versus consecutive 
sentences. In the instant case, the difference in the amount 
of time the defendant will have to serve in prison in ten years. 
The defendant submits that by the trial court's failure to 
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protect his "rights to due process of law" when he was entering 
his plea of guilty and by not informing him of the consequences 
of his plea/ this Court must now affirm the decision of the 
Court of Appeals to vacate the defendant's convictions. 
And finally, the petitioner, State of Utah, cites 
the case of State v. Plum, 378 P.2d 671 (Utah 1983), which 
sets forth the standard for those seeking to upset a plea of 
guilty must meet: 
[T]he sentence in a criminal case is a final 
judgement and one who should set aside such a final 
order, must proceed as the attacker and has the burden 
of producing convincing proof of a fact which consti-
tutes a legal ground for setting aside such sentence. 
Again, this case does not apply to the case of this defendant. 
The defendant in the instant case has surpassed the burden 
of producing convincing proof of a number of facts and issues 
which constitutes a legal ground for this Court to now affirm 
the Utah Court of Appeals1 unanimous decision to set aside 
this defendant's plea of guilty. 
The defendant has shown good cause that the trial 
court abused it discretion in denying his motion to withdraw 
his plea of guilty under Utah Code Ann., Section 77-13-6, which 
sets no time limit for a defendant to withdraw his plea of 
guilty. See: State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 
Further, the Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied 
the law in this particular case, and also applied the past 
decisions of this Court in their unanimous opinion. 
-18-
CONCLUSION 
The instant case of the defendant presently before 
this Court for review is a simple one in nature. The trial 
court failed to comply with state and federal statutory require-
ments involving the acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea 
to three felony counts of theft by deception. 
The Rule 11(e) mandate is clear: the requirement 
to inform a defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences 
when pleading to multiple offenses is not discretionary. The 
rule uses the term "shall" not "may." Hornbook Law on stautory 
interpretation of the word "shall" does not allow for discretion 
to deviate. 
Therefore, as stated above, the trial court did, 
in fact, abuse its discretion by not allowing the defendant 
to withdraw his plea of guilty. On this particular issue, 
the trial court violated the defendant's "rights to due process 
of law" which are guaranteed to him under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and also under 
Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
In State v. Vasilacopulos, Supra, the Utah Court 
of Appeals held the following in their unanimous decision: 
We conclude the record as a whole does not affirm-
atively establish defendant's full knowledge and under-
standing of the consequences of his plea under Rule 
11(e)(5). Defendant has therefore satisfied his burden 
of showing good cause under Section 77-13-6. The 
trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea. . . 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea is reversed. Defendant's 
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convictions are vacated/ and the matter is remanded 
for further proceedings. 
We concur: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly found that the 
trial court had abused its discretion in denying defendants 
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty with respect to Section 
77-13-6, of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 1988, which 
sets .no statutory time limit for withdrawal of a plea of guilty. 
The question: How long did a defendant have to withdraw 
his guilty plea? is now dispositive. Again, Section 77-13-6 
sets ri£ time limit for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty, 
and this Court has held the same to be true in other cases 
that have come before it on the same issues and circumstances. 
Therefore, if this Court is to uphold the mandated 
statutory provisions of the State of Utah as contained in the 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 1988, and the Constitution 
of the United States of America, as well as the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, then it must clearly see in the interest 
of justice to deny the petitioner, State of Utahfs, petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari in its entirety. 
DATED on this 31 day of August, 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
. VASILACOPULOS 
dant/Respondent 
ney Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I have mailed four true and 
correct photocopies of the foregoing RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR WR J T OP (~T;RT1i IRAKI to the following on this 
31 day of August, 1988. 
(1) STANLEY H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
^ 
. VASILACOPULOS 
dant-Respondent 
ney Pro Se 
Office Box 250 
r, Utah 84020 
A P P E N D I X A 
Acceptance of Mr. Carlton's own values 
reveals no serious inequity or abuae of 
discretion in the property distribution as 
far as he is concerned. Although Mrs. 
Carlton might have some reason to com-
plain, she has not cross-appealed to chal-
lenge the trial court's award.1 The find-
ings show that the trial court considered 
each item of property. The premarital 
property was delineated and awarded re-
spectively to each party. Hers was as-
signed a total value; his was not Individ-
ual valuations of their premarital assets 
were not material since the ultimate issue 
was the equitable division of marital prop-
erty, not premarital property. 
Where the asset values claimed by appel-
lant at trial show he received an equitable 
share of the marital property and no dear 
abuse of discretion s otherwise proven, we 
ought to defer to the trial court's property 
distribution. The judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
V> | y **••»»^««r 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
v. 
JOD C VASILACOPULOS, Del end ant 
and Appellant. 
No. 870291-GA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 3, 1988. 
Rehearing Denied July 19, 1988. 
Defe* dant appealed from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho-
9. The property distribution b also eminently 
fair when reviewed on the basis of marital in-
come. The majority identifies a seven-year 
marriage and acknowledges that Mr. Carlton 
"earned over $100,000 00 gross annual income 
during most of the marriage.* Their taa returns 
show that his adjusted gross income ranged 
from a high of 1117,000 to a low of ISS.000. 
Tbc parties maintained a frugal lifestyle, except 
for regular business trips that were expensed 
through his CPA business* Most of the approxi-
mer F. Wilkinson, J., was denied motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. The Court of Ap-
peals, Bench, J., held that record did not 
establish that defendant understood possi-
bility of consecutive sentences when he en-
tered plea of guilty. 
Reversed, convictions vacated, and 
matter remanded. 
I Criminal Law *=»1149 
Denial of motion to withdraw guntj 
plea wflj be reversed only when it dearly 
appears that the trial court has abused its 
discretion. U.CJL1953, T7-1S-6. 
X. Criminal Law €=»273.1(4) 
Trial court may not rely on defense 
counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy 
specific requirements of admonishing de-
fendant before accepting plea of guflty. 
UCJL1953, 77-35-ll(e). 
J Courts e*l<XXl). 
Where defendant entered his guilty 
plea prior to date of Supreme Court deci-
sion requiring strict compliance with admo-
nition requirements, the strict compliance 
standard did not apply and test for review-
ing efficacy of plea bearing was whether 
the record as a whole affirmatively estab-
lished that defendant entered his plea with 
knowledge and understanding of its conse-
quences. U.CJL1953, T7-35-ll(e). 
4. Criminal Law «=»273.1(4) 
Defendant's statement that he hat 
gone over affidavit with his attorney ant 
understood the contents of that guilty plea 
affidavit and that he understood that b 
was waiving his right to trial, to confron 
witnesses, and to appeal to a higher cour 
did not establish that defendant understoo 
mately 1700,000 of income earned during tt 
marriage was invested in liquid assets. Tt 
court found an accumulation of only J228.00 
I Hod it inconceivable that the remaining $473 
000 of income was spent by these two people ft 
consumables during their short marriage. Ml 
Carlton was au*ardcd no alimony. Her $11' 
000 property award, about which she has 0 
complained, appears fair, equitable and c* 
generous to Mr. Carlton's side of the ledf 
Q U I I T M fJd 
possibility of consecutive sentences, and 
guilty plea was thus invalid. U.C.A.1953, 
77-S5-U(e). 
James N. Barber (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen.f Stephen 
J. Sorensen, AssL Atty. Gen., Stanley H. 
Olson (argued), AssL Atty. Gen., for plain-
tiff and respondent 
Before BENCH, DAVIDSON and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant Jon VasDacopulos appeals 
from a trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse and 
remand 
Defendant was charged by amended in-
formation with twenty felony counts of 
theft by deception, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 7&-&-405 (1978). A prelimi-
nary bearing was held and defendant was 
bound over for trial on eighteen of the 
twenty counts. On February 17, 1984, de-
fendant entered a guilty plea to three of 
the felony counts, one second degree and 
two third degree, based on a memorandum 
agreement that the remaining counts 
would be dismissed and sentencing would 
be delayed untO August 1984. Defendant 
executed an affidavit waiving his rights, 
acknowledging his guilt, and affirming the 
voluntariness of his plea. Defendant failed 
to appear for sentencing. The trial court 
issued a bench warrant, and one year later 
defendant was arrested. He was sen-
tenced to consecutive terms of incarcerm-
tion for the three felonies and a total fine 
of $20,000. 
Defendant filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion of sentence b November 1985, a peti-
tion for habeas corpus relief in June 1986, 
a motion for resentencing in February 
1987, and a motion to withdraw his plea in 
September 1987. The court denied his mo-
tions and dismissed his petition. Defend-
ant fOed a notice of appeal from the trial 
court's denial of his motion for resentenc-
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ing, a petition for writ of mandamus, and a 
notice of appeal from the court's denial of 
his motion to withdraw his plea. The three 
actions were consolidated for appeal by or-
der of this Court 
[11 On appeal, defendant claims his 
guilty plea was involuntary and improperly 
taken by the trial court, and, therefore, the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to 
withdraw his plea. Utah Code Ann. 
( 77-13-6 (1982) states, in part, "A plea of 
guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon 
good cause shown and with leave of court" 
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea will be reversed only when it clearly 
appears the trial court has abused its dis-
cretion. State v. Mtldenhall, 747 P.2d 422 
(Utah 1987). 
Defendant argues the trial court abused 
its discretion by failing to comply with 
Utah RCrim.P. 11(e) (Utah Code Ann. 
\ 77-35-ll(e) (1987)). Rule 11(e) states: 
The court . . . shall not accept [a plea of 
guilty] untO the court has made the find-
ings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does 
not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation, to a jury trial and to confront 
and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by en-
tering the plea he waives all of those 
rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands 
the nature and elements of the offense 
to which he is entering the plea; that 
upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the mini-
mum and maximum sentence that may 
be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of con-
secutive sentences; and 
94 U**h 756 PACIFIC REPORT K Id SERIES 
(6) Whether the tendered plea la a re-
sult of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement and if so, what agreement 
has been reached. 
See also R Prac DistCir Cts 3.6. Defend-
ant claims the trial court failed to find he 
understood the nature and elements of the 
offenses and the possibility of the imposi-
tion of consecutive sentences, in violation 
of subsections 4 and 5 of Rule 11(e). 
In the companion eases of Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P-2d S09 (Utah 1985), and 
Brooks v Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 
1985), the trial courts substantially fol-
lowed the litany required by Rule 11(e). In 
Warner, however, the court failed to ask 
defendant whether he was aware he had a 
right against compulsory self-incrimination. 
Similarly, in Brooks the court failed to ask 
defendant whether he understood he was 
waiving his right against self-incrimination. 
In both cases, the Utah Supreme Court 
held, "Although the letter of Rule 11 was 
not complied with, we find that the record 
as a whole affirmatively establishes that 
defendant entered his plea with full knowl-
edge and understanding of its conse-
quences and of the rights he was waiv-
i n g . . . " Warner, 709 P.2d at 810; 
Brooks, 709 P.2d at 311. The Court re-
affirmed its decisions in Warner and 
Brooks in State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 
(Utah 1986). 
12) Subsequently, m State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah Su-
preme Court, without acknowledging War-
ner, Brooks, or Miller, effectively replaced 
the prior "record as a whole9* test with a 
strict Rule 11(e) compliance test in accept-
ing a defendant's guilty plea. In Gibbons, 
the Court remanded defendant's appeal of 
his guilty plea as defendant had failed to 
first file a motion to withdraw his plea, 
thereby disallowing the trial court the op-
portunity to address an alleged error. 
However, the Court retained jurisdiction 
over the ease for any necessary future 
action and utilized the opportunity to issue 
"a statement of law concerning the taking 
of guilty pleas in all trial courts in this 
state. . . ." Id at 1312. In its statement 
of law, the Gibbons Court held, "Rule 11(e) 
squarely places on trial courts the burden 
of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 
11(e) requirements are complied with when 
a guilty plea is entered." Id. Trial courts 
may not rely on defense counsel or exe-
cuted affidavits to satisfy the specific re-
quirements of Rule 11(e). Id at 1313. 
Rather, with or without an affidavit or 
defense counsel's advice, the trial court 
must conduct an on-the-record review with 
defendant of the Rule 11(e) requirements. 
Id at 1314. 
(3) In the instant case, defendant t> 
tered his plea on February 17, 19&4. 
Therefore, the strict Rule 11(e) compliance 
standard established under Gibbons in 
1987 does not apply. See United Slates v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct 2579, 73 
LEd.2d 202 (1982); State v. Norton, 675 
P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) (when a new rule of 
criminal procedure constitute* a clear 
break with the past, it will not be applied 
retroactively). Rather, we will apply the 
Warner-Brooks test to determine whether 
the record as a whole affirmatively estab-
lishes defendant entered his plea with fuD 
knowledge and understanding of its conse-
quences, namely the possibility of the impo-
sition of consecutive sentences. 
[4) At defendant's change of plea hear 
ing, the trial court reviewed with defendant 
that upon his plea of guilty to three counts, 
the prosecution would dismiss the remain-
ing counts at the time of sentencing. The 
following exchange then occurred: 
Is that your intent, air? 
Yes, it a. 
Now have you gone over an affidavit 
with your attorney? 
Yes, I have. 
And do you understand the contents of 
that document? 
Yea, I do. 
And do you understand if you sign that 
you will be pleading guilty, as I have 
indicated to you? 
Ytt 
You also understand that if you sign that 
you will be waiving your right to a trial, 
your right to confront the witnesses, 
your right to appeal to a higher court? 
ANDERSON v, 
Ote m* 756 T2d 
Yet. 
You also understand that if you were to 
go to trial in this matter you would not 
be compelled to take the witness stand 
and testify? 
Yes, I do. 
Are you presently under the influence of 
any type of alcohol or medication or nar-
cotics that would impair your ability to 
exercise your free consent? 
No, I am not 
Are you doing this of your own free will 
and consent? 
Yes, I am. 
Do you understand that these other 
counts, which I have read to you, will not 
be dismissed today, but they will be held 
pending until the date of sentencing? 
Yes, I do. 
How do you plead, air? 
Guilty. 
You may proceed and execute your affi-
davit 
The trial court clearly failed to find de-
fendant understood the possibility of con-
secutive sentences. The state argues the 
record as a whole affirmatively establishes 
defendant's full awareness of such a possi-
bility. We disagree. The only record evi-
dence the state can marshal for its position 
is the pre-sentence report and recommenda-
tion submitted at the sentencing hearing 
which was held one and one-half vears af-
ter defendant entered his plea. The record 
as a whole supports a conclusion that de-
fendant would only be subject to consecu-
tive sentences under certain conditions. 
Paragraph 7 of defendant's affidavit 
states, "I also know that if I am on proba-
tion, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon 
another offense of which I have been con-
victed or to which I have plead [sic] guilty, 
my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed on 
me/' 
We conclude the record as a whole does 
not affirmatively establish defendant's full 
knowledge and understanding of the conse-
quences of his plea under Rule U(eX5). 
Defendant has therefore satisfied his bur-
den of showing good cause under section 
77-13-6. The trial court abused its discre-
BRINKERHOFF Utah 95 
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tion in denying defendant's motion to with-
draw his plea. In light of our conclusion, 
we do not reach defendant's other claim 
regarding Rule 11(e)(4). 
The trial court s denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea is re-
versed. Defendant's convictions are vacat-
ed, and the matter is remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DAVIDSON, and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
HYKUNSUSTSTW 
»v» ^ v ^ s> 
Mont R ANDERSON, Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff, Lena Brinkerhoff, and 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff, Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents, 
v. 
Elsie BRINKERHOFF, Golda B. Adair, 
Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Gould-
ing, and John Does I thru Y, Defend-
ants and Appellants. 
No. 880122-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 9, 1988. 
Purchasers of property brought action 
to quiet title and for specific performance 
of contract The Sixth District Court, 
Kane County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered 
judgment in favor of purchasers, and ap-
peal followed. The Court of Appeals, Bill-
ings, J., held that (1) evidence supported 
finding that contract for sale of land had 
not been abandoned, but rather that vendor 
had waived strict compliance with contrac-
tual terms; (2) forfeiture provision of con-
tract was not self-executing; and (3) evi-
dence supported finding that subsequent 
deeds executed by vendor to other family 
members were invalid because vendor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
TN AillJ hJiiR f.;AM 1AEE C O U N T S , S T A T E OF U T A H 
JON VASILACOPULOS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY DELAND, Director, Utah 
State Department of Corrections> 
et al., 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO C • 86 4 59 4 
Before the Court is petitioner's request for post-conviction 
relief. The petitioner was present and represented by counsel. 
The respondent was r epresented by iioiii isel Prior to this hearing 
the parties had briefed the issue which Is the subject of this 
hearing. Counsel and the petitioner argued their respective 
positions. The Cunrt tool* * he matter under -idv iseroent tn further 
consider the authorities cited by the parties and to review, in 
light of the parties' arguments, the recent Utah Supreme Court 
decision of State v. Gibbons, 6 0 Utah \dv Rep V> (Utah Supreme 
Court, .June 30, 1987) . The Court has now considered the 
arguments and authorities cited, and being otherwise fully 
advised, enters the icLIowii'.g Menur ar iuni derision. 
The Petition in this case raised a number of bases for the 
post-conviction relief sought by the petitioner. This -Court in 
prior hearings has resolved a port ion cf those issues, and there 
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remains for determination petitioner's claim that the trial court 
failed to advise petitioner of the possibility consecutive 
sentences oefore accepting 'he petitioner's qi w. .ileas, and 
that he had ineffective counsel. 
The single issue for disposition at this time is the former, 
to wit: is ":.he petitioner entitled t,,: relief under Pule ":v;B nf 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the alleged failure of the 
trial court to advise petitioner of the possibility of 
consecut ive sentences wi: 1 ei i pet 111 one r wa s p 1 ead i ng gu i 1 t y t o 
multiple charges. 
A review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing of 
which the petitioner complains, is devoid of ,any statement, or 
suggestion by the court that the possibility of consecutive 
sentences existed. The so-called "Boykin11 affidavit fails to 
address the possibility of consecutive sentences, except 
situations that are and were not applicable to this petitioner. 
T h e obi i g a t1 o n o f t h e t r I a I • :: on rt 1:: ::> s o a d v i se the petitioner of 
the possibility of consecutive sentences Is set out in Rule 11 of 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Section 77-35-11, Utah Code 
Ann,, 19 511 as amended). The Rule states in part: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept such a plea 
until the court has made the findings: 
* * * 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
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The respondent suggests that the trial court1s failure to 
comply with Rule 11 does not invalidate the plea, and does not 
rise to the J, evel f; ,» a 1.1 cm J;ev lew indt-1; t he prov i s i ons providing 
for post-conviction relief rhis Court disagrees. The Rule 11 
mandate is clear. The requirement to inform a defendant of the 
possibility of consecutiv e sei itenc <es M lie .i i pi ea :I i ng to mu] tiple 
offenses is not discretionary. The Rule uses the term "shall" 
not "may." Hornbook law on statutory interpretation of the word 
"shall" does not allow for discretion to deviate. 
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that pleas must be 
carefully taken, by the txi a ] courts. in Gibbons, Justice Stewart 
addressed the issue of the trial court's responsibility, and the 
impropriety of relyinc solely upon the so-called "Boykin" 
affidavit. Whil e it, - iffidavit used in Gibbons 
was different than the one used , the present case, the instant 
affidavit is clearly deficient on the question of consecutive 
sentiences m h e principles of Gibbons
 a p p i y , This Court is 
satisfied that the issue raised rises to the 1evel of required 
constitutional magnitude to be considered in an appropriate case 
under the provisions of Pule 6 SB of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The issue of consecutive sentences had not been, directly put 
t.iij t.Jhie sentencing judge lb way of m motion ti withdraw the plea. 
While it appears from the transcript of a post-sentencing hearing 
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conducted on May 1, 1987, that the issue of consecutive sentence 
was discussed, there was no formal motion to withdraw the pleas 
that had previously been made before the court. Again, Gibbons 
is dispositive. The matter should first be put to the sentencing 
trial court. If the petitioner is dissatisfied with the trial 
court's ruling on his motion to withdraw his earlier entered 
pleas, should such a motion be made, the petitioner would have 
the right of direct appeal. This Court has been informally 
advised that the sentencing phase of the criminal case is on 
appeal before the Utah Supreme Court, although the precise issue 
addressed here has not been raised. 
Proceedings under Rule 65B are in the form of "extraordinary 
writs" and should only be used when all other legal remedies 
usually available have been exhausted. Here, the usual remedies 
have not been exhausted. To the contrary, the trial judge should 
at least be afforded the first opportunity to correct any 
problems in the acceptance of the petitioner's guilty pleas, 
should any exist, before the extraordinary remedy of post-
conviction relief is sought. 
Accordingly, the petitioner's Petition is dismissed without 
prejudice on the bases set forth above. 
This Court does not address the question of competency of 
counsel, or whether or not under all of the circumstances of this 
case that the requirements of Rule 11 were complied with, or were 
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not complied with. This Court's discussion of the plain reading 
of Rule 11 is intended only to provide a basis for this Court's 
determination that the issue rises to the necessary 
constitutional level so as to be dealt with under proper 
circumstances pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Counsel for the petitioner is to prepare an Order in 
accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit the same to 
the Court for review and signature in accordance with the Local 
Rules of Practice. 
Dated this /£ day of September, 1987. 
_J2£ 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this /£> dav of September, 1987: 
Kevin J. Kurumada 
Attorney for Petitioner 
431 East 300 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jon C. Vasilacopulos 
Pro se 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Sandra L. Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(^,iA±£i'j'*fi^P^nJ 
A P P E N D I X C 
In the District Court of the Thix^iudicial District 
THE STATE QFjUT^K, "'-^ w,,^  tf^ ^ftA , 7 
' Plaintiff-—;7« \ 7 * , • krLy 
—^ .vs . 7
 c«3^w§fi%it of Defendant 
^ Defendant jZ-r"' 
- . under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 
guiltv to the charges) of: ; '
 m ^ , % — m /*, * ^ / • 
n, ^ ft, A.yfe* a/e£/^,(a-g) ^ # ^ &, ^ „ 
Elements: Facts: 
have received a copy of the charge (Information) and understand the crime f am pleading e i^lty to is a 
(Degree of Felony or Class of Misdemeanor) 
and understand the punishment for this crime may be 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ pn>on term 
:   / * " I ' - > U ^
 y Q~Sf f^ 
fine, or baih. I am not on drues or alcohol 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney „ 
who has explained my rights to me and i understand them. O / V l / t J* C c *t* ^ A-^ f 
1. 1 know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which 1 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should i desire. 
2. ! know that if! wish to have a trial. ! have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court m my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. 1 also 
know that 1 have a nght to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that 1 could testify on my own behalf, and that if 1 choosenot todoso. thejury will be told that this may not be heid 
against me. 
3.1 know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that i have a nght not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
i cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless 1 choose 
to do so. 
5. 1 know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that 1 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the tnal 
proceedings and that if 1 could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. 1 know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty 1 am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceeding paragraphs and that 1 am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
\ I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which 1 have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. 
8. ( know that the fact that I have entered a pleaofguiity does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence wul 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to mduce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)): y 
will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. 1 am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsellor the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. 1 have read this Affidavit, or 1 have had it read to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents. I 
am — : * ~ d a _ years of age. have attended school through the and I can read and 
understand the English language. 
Dated this dav of. si rue* <3r 19 
\S _ Defendant _^-
J**. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me in Court this. zz Defendaru ^^-r ^ .day of /^^^ 19 V \ 
^ A 
Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORN > EY 
fw, V**V*»Utmf*J*S I certify that I am the attorney for V** ^ ^ V ^ *^f~fW05 . •- defendant named above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him, and I discussed it with mm and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of us contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made byji^defendartrTfrtfee foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true. 
i *% fci^lfC > 4 a 
C* MJ\UtMf*k} defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case 
1 have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a pica have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the convictior^of the defendant for the pl^ajffered, and that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendants plea o( 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ofdered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. ^. —-"^ y 
/7 ..... 7***- „<ti Done in Court this 
District Judge 
A P P E N D I X D 
rtcnn t»« mp.rm'ti OFFICE. 
Salt UiHu County. Utah 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
STANLEY H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-7627 
FEB 17W 
OapmyCiwk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JON C. VASILACOPULOS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT 
Criminal No. CR 83-820 
The State of Utah, by and through counsel, Craig 
L. Barlow, Special Assistant Attorney General, and the 
defendant with the advice and agreement of counsel Ronald J. 
Yengich and Stephen, R. McCaughey, hereby agree on certain 
conditions tor the guilty pleas by defendant and date of 
sentencing of defendant. 
1
 , j\-*—*~"+ w4i i pitad guilty to Counts VI (a 
third degree felony), IX (a second degree felony) and XIII 
(a third degree felony) of the Second Amended Information, 
CR 83-820. 
2. Counts I, III, and XVIII of the Second Amended 
Information are dismissed upon motion of the State. 
3. Counts II, IV, V, VII, VIII, X, XI, XII, XIV, 
XV, XVI, XVII, XIX and XX of the Second Amended Information 
will be dismissed upon motion of the State at the time of 
sentencing. 
4. Defendant will appear before the Court on 
August 20, 1984,. at 9:00 a.m. to receive a date for 
sentencing and to have a pre-sentence report ordered. 
5. The delay in sentencing is a result of 
agreement between the State and the defendant based upon the 
following facts: 
(1) That defendant's February 14, 1984 trial 
date was continued by the Court (because no judges 
were available to hear the case); 
(2) That a new trial date would be set 
approximately in June, 1984; 
(3) That the trial of this matter would take 
approximately eight weeks; 
-2 
ULLThat defendant will plead guilty in 
February, 1984, on condition that the date for 
sentencing is on or about the date which would 
obtain if defendant were to exercise his right to 
a jury trial in June, 1984; and 
(5) That a delay in sentencing under the 
above circumstances allows defendant the liberty 
he would have if the trial were re-scheduled. 
6. During the period between the entry of the 
guilty pleas and the time of sentencing the following 
conditions shall apply: 
(a) Defendant will continue on bail. 
(b) Defendant shall not leave the United 
States of America. 
(c) Defendant will appear before the Court 
as agreed and ordered on August 20, 1984, at 9:00 
a.m. Failure to appear at that time will cause 
the issuance of a warrant for defendant's arrest 
and forfeiture of bail. 
7. Notwithstanding the agreement to delay 
sentencing in this matter based on the conditions recited 
above, upom motion of the State and good cause appearing the 
3 
Court may order the date for sentencing expedited. Such an 
order and sentence will not invalidate the guilty pleas. 
DATED this /7— day of February, 1984. 
RONALD J. TENGICH 
Attorney for Defendant 
\£.&A&/ 
CRAIG^ti BARLOW 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorney foe State of Utah 
STEPHEN R. MCCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
JO 
De & 
i£.OftAJ[ftfff\fruDafr VASILACOPULOS 
ndant 
- 4 -
A P P E N D I X E 
"SSSSSMs* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT AUG 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
M. Ofson 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff. 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
r t£Zl'f>C 
Count No. _ f l _ _ _ 
Honorable HOM6B P WtUIMSQfcl 
Clark 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Data 
D Tha motion of _ _ _ to enter a judgment of conviction for tha next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is Q granted D denied. There taring no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant haytarfbeaayonyfctwl bffftf J2%f^'tf*Qdurt; frptasVoigtsHty: 
O plee^f rh contest; of the offense of <^*l/j{*^ ^^iJ *™^*f^^**tr a felony 
of the 4*14 dagrj 
represented 
of the above often 
isdemeai 
the State rising represented by Cv. idBAiAtrfrffir* 
for santanca and 
snow sdjudged guilty 
sentenced to a term in the Utah Stata Prison: 
D \6 a maximum mandatory term of, 
| r not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
Oirot to exceed years; ^A*A& 
H|rJfMtQfdmrmA to nmv m flry» in t h * a m m i n t t%i l a fltfrii • 
, years and which may be for life: 
to pay a fine in tha a ount of % 
ordarad to pay restitution in tha amount 
linJMtrmrr^ 
• $dch santanca ia to fun concurrantty with 
p4pctt santenoa ia taf rias coMacttttyaiV wHR 
«rupoomoto Countfs) . 
O Defendant ia granted a stay of tha above (O priaon) santanca and placad on probation in tha 
custody of this Court and undar tha suparvieion of tha Chief Agent, Utah Stata Oapartmant of Adult 
/^ aroia for tha parted of , pursuant to tha attached craltione of probation. 
W Defendant ia remandad into tha custody of tha Shartff of Salt Lake County mor delivery to the Utah Stata 
Pripon, Drapar, Utah, or a for daiivary to tha Salt Lake County Jail, wham dafandant shaH be confined 
and impriaonad In accordance with thi%Judgmmt and Commitment 
Ir Commttnynt |haii issue ^/fafn44ft£it\ 
***
im?&z~ ,f— °ATE° m,f ^  *•*o< 
* ^ S P R O V E D AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT £ J p T C S T 
K DIXON HINDLEY 
Dafanaa Counaai 
Deputy County Attornay Paga^LofL^. 
IN T H I THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
!^V l^tt^ 
JUOQMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Count No. y 
Honorabla 
Clark 
Dafandant. 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Data M, /fffl* 
ALAN SMITH 
r 
O The motion of. . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason w*y sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant ha^d^pe^onvigtedbyJ^jNtfyfl^coujt b^pteeof guHty; 
O plea ej ncflbontest; of the offense of ^^^Af^ ^^jj &iEtfufaj+Pt/
 a felony 
of the £»f3j4Ugrp£ a\j class «_^ymisdemean*; being novj^ resenkln wfo/&j*m& for sentence snd 
represented by nt^44^4datw(i the State being represented by LLdJOaddljAum adjudged guilty 
of the above offense/is ng4 sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
&/o a maximum mandatory term of 
Dt to exceed five years; 
, years and which may be for Hfe; 
of not leee then one year nor more than fifteen years: 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life: 
O not to exceed years; \ # 
ajmi ordered to pey a flno In th# amount M " 
and ordered to pey leatftution In th# amount ^JhJJtAjn£*u/s 
run concurrently with 
'4mi **irJKlF*mr^* 
' /^^^^j- are hereby dismissed. 
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation In the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent Utah State Department of Adult 
/erole for the period of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
r Defendant Is remanded Into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County ^ for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or O for delivery to the Salt Lake County JaH, where defendant shad be confined 
imprisoned in accordance wtyythis Jirdgmgntind Commitment 
Commitment shall issue ^ ffi^rij ttwd*m / * & 
APPROVEO AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT 4 # D W E S T 
H. DIXON HINOUY 
Defenee Counaei 
Deputy County Attorney of J2_ P « * 
fclLi td^DJ 
IN THE THIRD JUOICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
^-^^ Vto4/*&0tUt*S\ 
Osfsndant. 
Cass No. 
Count No. 
Honorabis 
CIsrtc 
Rsportsr 
Bailiff _ 
Oats 
- ^ ^ 
HOMER F. W1LKIM! 
ALAN SMITH 3 u M ^ 
D Ths motion of to sntsr a judgment of conviction for ths nsxt lowsr catsgory of offsnss and 
impose ssntsncs accordingly is G grantsd D dsnisd. There bdng no legal or othsr rsason wjjy ssntsncs 
should not be impossd, and dsfsndant hayb^jfflyonvjs^jby^ tHtfsa of guilty; 
a piss of nd/contsst; of ths offsnss ef ^^^^J^ ^^[/ A~&fy*449£/
 a f0 jo n y 
of ths j*ah*ya£> Q a cltw j^^/nisdsmesnf^/being noyVsssr^n^tflrt ayfe rwd^ for ssntsncs and 
represented by AT» uyi/H^iASfH \H+ state being reprsssntsd by SjLJaBdaAtfmi 
of ths above offsnss/is now sentenced to a term in ths Utah Stats Prison: 
idjudgsd guilty 
D / O a maximum mandatory term of — 
V not to exceed ffvs years; 
O of not Isss than ons ysar nor mors than fifteen years; 
D of not Isss than fivs years and which may be for life: 
a /iqrto excssd years; 
, years and which may be for llfr. 
o,uOuf ordarad to pay a fbw is tha amount f %3, K f f i \ : i JJL. ' / 
m ma amount Jt$jr==. to fflJrf&IWUX' and ordered to p«y 
ssntsncs is to/un concurrently with 
T/rmrrpr>^ 
O Court Countfa) 
/f-a?f? 
ars hsrsby dismissed. 
O Osfsndant is grantsd a stay of ths abovs (O prison) ssntsncs and piacsd on probation in ths 
cu^ody of this Court and under ths supsrvision of ths Chisf Agent, Utah Steps Dspartmant of Adult 
Rirols for ths ported of . pursuant to ths attachsd conditions of probation. 
tVDsfsndant to rsmandsd into ths custody of ths Shsriff of Sait Laks County ^ or dsUvsry to ths Utsh State 
Prfaon, Draper, Utah, or O for dslivsry to ths Sait Laics County JaH, whsrs dsfsndant shsK bs confinsd 
spa Impdsonsd in eccordancs withjyt Judapsnt and Commitmsnt. 
I^Commitmsnt shall iasus ^^tutlUijrljJ • 
DATED this day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Oafanaa Counaai 
DISTRICT COURT ju^pe-pE37 
H OIXON HIND'.uY 
Daputy County Attornay Paga 
A P P E N D I X F 
RULE 4A Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals UTAH CODt 1987-19H 
that is filed after the expiration of the prescribed 
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance 
with the rules of practice of the court from which 
the appeal is taken. No extension shall exceed 30 
days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, 
whichever occurs later. 
RULE 4A. TRANSFER OF CASE FROM 
SUPREME COURT TO COURT OF APPEALS 
(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to Transfer. 
(b) Notice of Order of Transfer. 
(c) Receipt of Order of Transfer by Court of Appeals. 
(d) Filing or Transfer of Appeal Record. 
(e) Subsequent Proceedings Before Court of Appeals. 
(f) Finality of Order of Transfer. 
(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to Transfer. 
At any time before a case is set for oral argument 
before the Supreme Court, that Court may transfer 
to the Court of Appeals any case except those cases 
within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. 
Such order of transfer shall be issued without 
opinion, written or oral, as to the merits of the 
appeal or the reasons for the transfer. 
(b) Notice of Order of Transfer. 
Upon entry of the order of transfer by the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court, that Clerk shall immediately 
transmit the original of the order to the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals and give notice of entry of the 
order of transfer by mail to each party to the proc-
eeding and to the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal was taken. The Clerk of the Supreme Court 
shall make a note in the docket of that Court of the 
service by mail. 
(c) Receipt of Order of Transfer by Court of 
Appeals. 
Upon receipt of the original order of transfer 
from the Clerk of the Supreme Court, the Clerk of 
the Court of Appeals shall enter the appeal upon the 
Court of Appeals docket. Notice that the appeal has 
been docketed in the Court of Appeals shall there-
upon be immediately given by the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals to each party to the proceeding 
and to the clerk of the court from which the appeal 
was taken in the same manner as is prescribed by 
Rule 39(c) of these rules. 
(d) Filing or Transfer of Appeal Record. 
If the record on appeal has not been filed with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court at the date of the order 
of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall 
notify the clerk of the court from which the appeal 
is taken that upon completion of the conditions for 
filing the record by that court, the clerk shall tran-
smit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the Court 
of Appeals. If, however, the record on appeal has 
already been transmitted to and filed with the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court at the date of the entry of the 
order of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
shall transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of 
the Court of Appeals within five days of the date of 
the entry of the order of transfer. 
(e) Subsequent Proceedings Before Court of 
Appeals. 
Upon receipt by the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals of the order of transfer and the entry 
thereof upon the docket of the Court of Appeals, 
the matter or case shall proceed before the Court of 
Appeals to final decision and disposition as in other 
appellate cases pursuant to the rules of procedure of 
the Court of Appeals. 
(f) Finality of Order of Transfer. 
An order of transfer, when entered by the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court, is final and shall be subject 
to reconsideration only in the Supreme Court and 
only on jurisdictional grounds. 
RULE 4B. CERTIFICATION BY THE COURT OF 
APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT 
(a) Transfer. 
(b) Procedure for Transfer. 
(c) Criteria for Transfer. 
(a) Transfer. 
In any case over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction, the Court may, upon 
the affirmative vote of four judges of the Court, 
certify a case for immediate transfer to the Supreme 
Court for determination. 
(b) Procedure for Transfer. 
The Court of Appeals may, on its own motion, 
decide whether a case should be certified. Any party 
to a case may, however, by way of a "suggestion for 
certification/ file and serve a statement not excee-
ding five pages setting forth the reasons why the 
party believes that the case should be certified. The 
suggestion may not be filed prior to the filing of a 
docketing statement. Within ten days of service, an 
adverse party may file a statement not in excess of 
five pages either supporting or opposing the sugge-
stion for certification. If a case is certified to the 
Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
shall immediately transfer the case, including the 
record and file of the case from the court or trib-
unal from which the appeal is taken, all papers filed 
theretofore in the Court of Appeals, and a written 
statement of all docket entries in the case up to and 
including the certification order, to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
shall promptly notify all parties and the clerk of the 
court from which the appeal was taken that the case 
has been transferred. Upon notification that a case 
has been transferred, the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court shall send notices to all parties and the clerk 
of the court from which the appeal was taken that 
the case has been transferred to the Supreme Court 
and that all further filings will be made with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court under the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, stating the docket number 
assigned to the case in the Supreme Court. 
(c) Criteria for Transfer. 
The Court of Appeals shall consider certificatidi 
only in the following cases: 
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it j? 
apparent that the case should be decided by # 
Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court wouH 
probably grant a petition for writ of certiorari in th* 
case if decided by the Court of Appeals, irrespecdv| 
of how the Court of Appeals might rule, and -^  
(2) Cases which will govern a number of othC 
cases involving the same legal issue or issues pending 
in the district courts, juvenile courts, circuit courrf] 
or the Court of Appeals or which are cases of ft* 
impression under state or federal law that will haw 
wide applicability. 
RULE 4C. TRANSFER OF IMPROPERLY 
PURSUED APPEALS 
If a notice of appeal or a petition for reviews 
filed in a timely manner but is incorrectly pursuedjB 
the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Cottjj 
yp"3 
in* ^ 
the Court of Appeals', either on motion of any 
or sua sponte, shall transfer the case, including 
C O D S * 
PfO«0.«fUJ 510 For Annotations, consult CODE* Co'* Annotation Service 
